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This paper is an edited version of an email interview conducted by 
Debra Ferreday and Adi Kuntsman with Anne-Marie Fortier, the 
author of Multicultural Horizons: Diversity and the Limits of the Civil 
Nation (Routledge, 2008). Fortier’s work has been informative in the 
development of some of the arguments explored in this special issue; 
in their conversation Ferreday and Kuntsman asked her to comment 
on the ideas of haunting, racial imaginaries, nostalgia, national 
anxieties, political feelings and hopes for the future. 
 
Introduction 
The work of Anne-Marie Fortier has been informative in the 
development of some of the arguments explored in this special issue. 
In her recent book on multiculturalism and technologies of citizenship, 
Multicultural Horizons: Diversity and the Limits of the Civil Nation 
(2008a), Fortier showed how white Britain is haunted by its colonial 
legacies, histories of domination and difference, and modes of mixing, 
proximity and distance, and intimacy. She continues to explore these 
questions in her current work; for instance, her article „The Blood in 
our Veins‟ (2008b; see also Fortier 2011) on genes, ancestry and 
biometric bodies, develops the concept of „technologies of 
reassurance‟. Her analysis of national anxieties, affective citizenship 
and technologies of reassurance has been instrumental in shaping 
our thinking about ghosts and haunting as well as on affect: for 
example, looking at anxieties about Britain‟s racial make-up which 
inspired us to think about the ways in which imagined futures might be 
haunted, and haunting.  
We asked Anne-Marie to begin by commenting on the idea of haunted 
futurities and elaborating on the ways in which the notion of racial 
ghosts and haunting work in her argument, moving from the past to 
the future. 
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Anne-Marie Fortier: First, I would like to thank you for inviting me to 
be part of this special issue. I really like the temporal framing that you 
foreground; the emphasis on how we might think of haunting as 
something that is not confined to the past and present, but which is 
also projected into the future. In this regard, it‟s not only that futures 
are haunted, but they can also be haunting in the sense that imagined 
futures have their ghosts that haunt the present and inform present 
actions.  
This takes me to your question on „racial ghosts‟ and haunting. One of 
the issues that I seek to examine in all my work is the endurance and 
reconfigurations of racisms, racial thinking, and ideas of „race‟. And I 
look at how these are inflected by ideas of gender, sexuality, and 
generations. In Multicultural Horizons (MH), I discuss the ambivalence 
integral to the British nationalist project, which is an ambivalence that 
Paul Gilroy (2004) has identified in his notion of Britain‟s post-colonial 
melancholia: the ambivalent relationship to the past—to the Empire 
more specifically—that arises between the distress resulting from the 
realisation of the Empire‟s abuses and violence, on the one hand, and 
the desire to remember the Empire as a source of national pride, on 
the other. In MH, I consider how Britain‟s melancholic state constitutes 
the context that allows for particular versions of multiculturalism to 
develop (including anti-multiculturalism).   
But at the same time, multiculturalism and anti-multiculturalism both 
include a projection into the future. The very logic of the anti-
multiculturalist backlash is to look at the assumed past failures of 
multiculturalism—e.g. that it fosters separatism rather than 
cohesion—and to project them onto an undesirable, if not nightmare-
ish future. Multiculturalism, and now cohesion and integration, are the 
preferred frames of reference to think about uncertain futures haunted 
by the urgencies of the present. And various governing strategies are 
put forward and put in place in attempts to attend to or prevent failed 
integration, failed cohesion. From New Labour‟s cohesion agenda to 
Cameron‟s „Big Society‟, a range of technologies of citizenship are 
deployed in attempts to enable cohesive or, as Cameron puts it, „real‟ 
communities.  
I‟ve often been asked what I mean by „technologies of reassurance‟ in 
the paper you are referring to, „The Blood in our Veins‟ (BV). The 
paper is about a television documentary series called Face of Britain. 
The series documents a genetic study aimed at tracing ancient 
migrations in the British Isles and at tracing links between present day 
rural inhabitants and ancient Celts, Anglo-Saxons, Vikings, and 
Normans. I examine how digital photography, morphing technologies, 
population statistics and genetics are variously combined to operate 
as technologies of reassurance in the context of wider public debates 
about the future of multi-ethnic Britain, national identity, and fears that 
the country will be „swamped‟ by immigrants. So I was asked who it is 
that is being reassured, and what are they reassured against. This is 
a fair question. Is it the genetic scientists who are reassuring 
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themselves that genetic science can answer questions that, according 
to them, history or archaeology can only speculate about? Is it the 
television producers or the research team who are reassuring the 
viewers that they can finally „know who they really are‟? Who are the 
viewers? Or who do the producers think the viewers are? I used 
„technologies of reassurance‟ to refer to the ways in which the „natural 
facts‟ generated through the combination of scientific, visual and 
statistical technologies are cast as answers to concerns about the 
nature of national identity in the context of globalization and increased 
diversity—in the context of what Kim TallBear (2007) refers to as the 
narrative of the „vanishing indigene‟ (which I develop further in Fortier 
2011). In this way, technologies of reassurance generate ideas about 
the subjects that need to be reassured (the national „we‟, particularly 
the „indigenous‟ Britons), as well as those against whom they need 
reassuring (those deemed „not- indigenous‟, „new migrants‟). A second 
feature of these technologies of reassurance is that Face of Britain 
uses visual technologies that resemble nineteenth-century 
physiognomy, which operated as a technology of reassurance, a kind 
of „survival kit‟, as Melissa Percival puts it (2005, p. 22), for the new 
urban dweller dealing with a new sense of estrangement from her 
other urban dwellers. By creating „average faces‟ for different regions 
of the British Isles, Face of Britain is developing a contemporary 
version of physiognomy that differs from its nineteenth-century 
predecessor on a number of counts, but that still operates as 
„reassurance‟ in the sense that it makes visible, and „confirms‟ those 
invisible links to genetic ancestry (see Fortier 2011). 
So to return to your question, I see how the reading of MH and then 
BV takes us from hauntings that move from the past to the future, 
respectively. But I think that this temporality is not necessarily linear. 
As I suggest earlier, the anti-multiculturalist backlash has to be 
understood in its specific manifestations—and in Britain, it is haunted 
by a post-colonial melancholia, but it is also haunted by imagined 
futures. And these imagined futures are figured in the body of „youths‟. 
David Cameron‟s speech about radicalisation, which he delivered at 
the Munich Security Conference in February this year (2011),1 is all 
about young Muslim men. He announces the introduction of the 
National Citizen Service for 16 year-olds from „different backgrounds‟. 
He, like the government before this one, targets young people in the 
hope that his programmes will shape future „good citizens‟ who will be 
active in his Big Society. The figure of the young person does a lot of 
work in haunting, and is placed as the linchpin between pasts and 
futures. In that regard, I think that the work on critical multiculturalism 
has neglected the role of the generational trope, particularly the figure 
of the young person (and more broadly, ideas of kinship). We can be 
reminded, for example, of Lauren Berlant‟s The Queen of America 
Goes to Washington City (1997), where she writes about the child as 
needing protection from the state.  
Adi Kuntsman: There seems to be a shift between two slightly 
different figures at work here: that of „youth‟/young person/teenager 
which you mention here and that of a child (as in Lauren Berlant‟s 
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work that you are referring to, or, for example, in Claudia Castañeda‟s 
(2002) work on the figure of the child in scientific imaginaries or in 
transnational adoption). You also turn to the child in your analysis of 
The Last White Kids documentary (in MH), which I would like to ask 
you about separately. But for now, could you say a few words about 
the difference between these two figures? 
Anne-Marie Fortier: I use „youth‟ to include the „child‟ while it is not 
reducible to it. The figure of the child as Castañeda uses it, is about 
figuring the „body-in-process‟, which „makes it eminently appropriable‟. 
In that sense, it is seen as malleable, as changeable, as available for 
adoption by the nation, as well as having the potential to develop into 
a subject that will adopt the nation. The figure of „youth‟, for its part, is 
that of a body that is perceived as more advanced in the 
developmental process and in that respect, can be more of a „threat‟ 
or a „challenge‟ to government concerns about good citizenship, 
cohesion, and so on.  
Berlant, for her part, focuses on the infantilisation of citizenship and of 
the use of the figure of the child as an ideal type of personhood (in the 
US) „on whose behalf national struggles are being waged‟ (Berlant 
1997, p. 21). My focus on multicultural youth is less about the 
infantilization of citizenship as it is about the ways in which she/he 
stands in for the successes, failures, and limits of multiculturalism. 
And the national struggles that I consider are not so much waged on 
behalf of the yet-to-be-formed child as they are waged to redress or 
prevent the growing youth from going on the wrong path—e.g. of 
excessive love or hate of the other (see The Last White Kids about 
that). 
But more broadly, your question suggests that it would be interesting 
to examine more fully the place of kinship and of the generational 
trope in multiculturalism, and to distinguish between the different 
generational figures.  
Adi Kuntsman: So now coming back to The Last White Kids. In 
thinking about your analysis of multiculturalism in MH and your recent 
work I am struck by the resonance between this idea of „disappearing 
white Britain‟  when you discuss The Last White Kids (chapter 4 in 
MH), and white unease and post-rural melancholia which you address 
in your work on the genetic Domesday Book (BV). Can you elaborate 
on this link/continuity/rupture here? What I am specifically interested 
in is the notion of racialised futures, and how some futurities are being 
put to work. What kind of feelings are mobilised here? What 
genealogies, routes, and connections are evoked? 
Anne-Marie Fortier: I think that the link between the two is the issue 
of the disappearance of white Britain—which is one element that is 
constitutive of what I call „white unease‟. Do you remember the 
television series produced by BBC 2, called The White Season, that 
was broadcast in the Spring of 2008? The subtitle was „Is white 
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working class Britain becoming invisible?‟ That‟s when I started 
thinking more about „white unease‟—which is a mild way of referring 
to the violence of some racist politics of white supremacy and white 
dominance. Anyway, what was evoked in The White Season was a 
romanticised notion of the working class as the moral backbone of the 
nation which was silenced, under siege and under threat of 
disappearance because it is neglected by politicians. I am not saying 
that the working class and the economically deprived are not subject 
to systems of inequality that the neo-liberal politics of „opportunities‟ 
ignores—particularly in the current climate. But this is not specific to 
the white working class—these issues concern people from a range of 
different racialised positions. By making this about the white working 
class, the series was basically making it about white Britain more 
broadly. And that series was not unique. The Last White Kids, which I 
write about in MH, was a television documentary about the „last white‟ 
working class family living in a largely Asian neighbourhood in 
Bradford. Issues of class, nation, „race‟ and gender were woven 
together here, in a story where the local and the personal are 
mobilized in debates over definitions of national identity and national 
culture.  And it is worth noting that the documentary inspired a 
dramatised version (called White Girl) that was broadcast during the 
BBC Two „White Season‟. 
And here we are back to the young person again, who is the site of 
projection of anxieties about the national future, particularly a 
racialised future. The figure of youth is taken up, or created (it is 
noteworthy that the „faces of Britain‟ created for the genetic mapping 
of Britain are all youthful faces), as the embodiment of the possibility 
of assimilation into, or destabilisation of, Britain and Britishness. There 
is a mix of desires, hopes, anxieties, and fears projected onto those 
figures of youth. And I think that what is at stake is the fantasy of 
national wholeness. Barnor Hesse (1999) writes about multicultural 
transruptions, i.e. how „the multicultural‟ reveals the impossibility of full 
national representation. But that fantasy of national wholeness has so 
much purchase, and many of the concerns about multiculturalism and 
immigration are about maintaining a sense of wholeness, a sense of 
unified „identity‟. Face of Britain is so interesting in this regard. Its 
subtitle is „Look in the mirror. Thousands of years of history is [sic] 
looking back at you‟. I couldn‟t resist doing a Lacanian reading of this 
and to look at how the „average faces‟ created with digital morphing 
technology, were „revealed‟ to viewers with a spirit of jubilation—the 
sound track of drumming rose in intensity each time faces were 
introduced on the screen—that Lacan associates with that moment of 
identification with the image reflected in the mirror: that moment when 
the infant sees the composed, „whole‟ body in the mirror and 
recognises it as hers. It is a moment where, according to Lacan, that 
„identity‟ provides an imaginary mastery over the body that the infant 
has thus far experienced as fragmented (Lacan 1954 [1988]). Face of 
Britain, for its part, offered an imaginary mastery over the national 
body through the creation of these faces that they link back to ancient 
Celts, Anglo Saxons, Vikings and Normans. The fantasy is further 
secured by collapsing genetics, history and territory, consequently 
borderlands 10:2  
6 
 
„subsuming indigenous definitions and meanings to genetic definitions 
and meanings‟, in the words of TallBear (2007, p. 421). 
Debra Ferreday: The figure of the child or the young person suggests 
orientation towards the future, while notions of ancestry turn us to the 
past. I would like to think further about the relations between the two. 
In particular, I‟m very interested in the way that nostalgia functions in 
relation to this sense of a lost rural past. In BV you cite Sarah Neal‟s 
argument that fantasies of the rural are „based on a de-racialized 
nostalgia for a pre-multicultural Britain‟ (Neal 2002, cited in Fortier 
2008b, p. 444). Could you say more about the relationship between 
stories about the past, and an imagined (and feared) future? 
Anne-Marie Fortier: The loss of the rural past figures prominently in 
Face of Britain, particularly the book version written by the science 
journalist Robin McKie (2006). I think more broadly it haunts ideas of 
„real communities‟, of „cohesion‟, and so on, in the sense that there is 
a nostalgia for close-knit communities. Also, rural or semi-rural areas 
are struggling against the forces of global capitalism and the impact 
on the agricultural industry in Britain. What I am interested in is how 
the rural comes to stand in for the nation and how the attachment to a 
particular imagining of what rural life is or was or should be is 
deployed in debates about the national future. In the book Face of 
Britain, the scientific practice and process is translated into a national 
narrative of the loss of a rural past, one that ties families to the land 
from generation to generation. In the television series, that loss is cast 
against the hyper-mobile, migrant urban setting. Genetics, history and 
territory are collapsed, blood and soil are intertwined in a nostalgic 
evocation of the „lost rural world‟ which constitutes the rural 
inhabitants as subjects whose connection to the land runs deep, as 
subjects who worked on the land and constitute the land as the object 
of their labour.  I think that Sarah Neal‟s words are very apposite 
here—the rural idyll in British popular culture, including „popularised‟ 
versions of science like Face of Britain, does mobilise a de-racialised 
nostalgia for a pre-multicultural Britain. A nostalgia that is based on 
the notion that the multicultural fosters separation and conflict, even 
racism—as if racism is something that results from the external forces 
of migration.  
Debra Ferreday and Adi Kuntsman: We would like to move from 
nostalgia now to another affective element in your work, namely, to 
the topic of fantasy and also to your concept of horizons. 
Adi Kuntsman: My questions evolve around your use of „horizons‟ in 
MH—horizons that are made of witnessing, questioning and 
imagining. You address horizons as structures of feeling (Williams 
1977), and this made me think of Avery Gordon‟s use of haunting as 
structure of feeling (Gordon 1997). Can horizons be haunted? Are 
they—or rather, when are they about haunting? Also, you note that 
horizons are about space as well as imaginative geographies. Are 
they also about time? More specifically, how can we put the concept 
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of horizons to work in thinking about futurities? (You mention also that 
horizons are about infinite possibilities—dreamlike or nightmare 
fantasy—this is what I had in mind when asking about futurities and 
possibly haunting futurities).  
Debra Ferreday: Fantasy is important in your work—on page 12 of 
MH, you cite Jacqueline Rose‟s notion of fantasy as not an escape 
from reality but rather „a kind of psychic glue which protects the 
nation/al from the horrors of the “real” that threaten the disintegration 
of the self; it keeps it whole‟ (Rose 1996, p. 3). This makes me 
wonder about the status of the „real‟ in your work. This terrifying 
imaginary „reality‟ seems to be part of the fantasy of nation, which 
leaves me wondering if there is a „real‟ real that is being obscured by 
the fantasy. In the conclusion you say that the national fantasy 
conceals „how messy, slippery and fragile‟ cultural differences and 
formations actually are. So what might it mean to come to terms with 
the real (or the actual)?  
Anne-Marie Fortier: Allow me to answer these two questions 
together, because I think that they are related. I have been thinking 
about horizons a lot recently, and wondering how it relates to 
imaginaries.  I‟ll return to this in a moment. 
Horizons in MH are about the simultaneous witnessing („we are 
multicultural‟; or „we are facing important challenges due to 
immigration‟), questioning („how do we create cohesion?‟), and 
imagining („the future Big Society‟).  These deliberations cast the 
nation/al in different temporalities—the past, present, and future—but 
they all meet in their quest to understand who the national „we‟ is, 
what it means at this particular moment in time, what the limits of the 
nation/al are, and where it should be headed. The witnessing, 
questioning and imagining work together like a diagnosis—identifying 
a problem, seeking a solution, and imagining the world as it will be 
once the solution has been put in place. So it‟s about how the national 
future is embattled through connections to a „reality‟ which is said to 
be in need of improvement or correction. That‟s what I was trying to 
get at with „horizons‟—to the ways in which the realities of the present, 
however mediated and differently experienced they may be, are the 
grounds from which questions and imaginings arise. It was my way of 
thinking about the national fantasy not as escape, but as something 
that is entangled with present „realities‟, indeed constitutive of them. In 
other words, the national fantasy—or fantasy in general—offers a 
frame for defining the world around us and through which that world, 
that „reality‟, can be lived and acted on. The nation is a fantasy image 
of the collective self which, as Lauren Berlant (1991) has argued, is 
brought into being in the public domain by repeatedly imagining that it 
exists as something real, out there, that binds the „national people‟ 
together.  
As „protective fiction‟, the nation as fantasy image is always in tension 
with that which exceeds representation, that which exceeds 
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intelligibility—„the real‟. In MH, I look at how „children of multicultural 
Britain‟ are differently figured in different „faces‟—the beautiful „models 
of modern Britain‟ versus the ugly „bad‟ (suicide bombers). I argue that 
the beauty of the models of modern Britons protect the fantasy of 
Britain as a tolerant, benevolent, feel-good place to be, while the 
horror of the suicide-bombers deeply perturbs the fantasy frame 
through which reality can be assessed and brings the violence of the 
world we live in to the heart of home, to the heart of the national self. 
For Lacan, the real is that which exceeds representation; it refers to 
that materiality of existence that precedes language. What I find 
problematic in his theory of the real is that it seems to assume a kind 
of pure „natural state‟ that infants enjoy before they enter into the 
symbolic order of language. For me, the real is that which exceeds 
representation in the sense that it is unintelligible within the fantasy 
image of our selves. So the „beautiful‟ and „ugly‟ faces of multicultural 
Britain are not separate entities, with the first being the offspring of the 
nation, and the second being born out of external forces. They are all 
products of the nation, integral to the national fantasy, and together 
they force the recognition of the very ambivalence of the nation/al as 
both heimlich and unheimlich, a thing of beauty and comfort and a 
thing of dread and death—the uncanny.  
Coming to terms with the real—if that‟s ever possible—would mean 
recognising that there is much that exceeds our fantasy frames, and 
that our reality is always threatened by that excess that can „erupt‟ at 
any time. Now when I say that, I am reminded of some feminist 
arguments in the 1990s—when the idea of the postmodern, fluid, 
unstable „identity‟ was celebrated—who reminded us of how easy it is 
to celebrate the un-rooted, unstable fictional identity when we „have‟ 
an identity in the first place, or when the „identity‟ we occupy is not 
contested, or pathologised, or criminalised. So coming to terms with 
„the real‟ is also about being reflexive about the position from which 
we create the fantasy images of ourselves and of others.   
The main reason I use horizons instead of imagination is because of 
its spatial connotation—it forces the recognition of the geographies of 
multiculturalism, or of migration (as in „migrant horizons‟, the title of a 
special issue of Mobilities that I co-edited with Gail Lewis, see Fortier 
& Lewis 2006). Considering how national fantasies produce who the 
nation/al are, is also about considering where they are. Both MH and 
BV, which you refer to in your questions, attend to the geographic 
imaginaries of sameness and difference. And in the case of BV, the 
politics of indigenisation that are at work in Face of Britain are 
decidedly about ancestral connections to this land. So at a very 
simple level, horizons was taken literally to refer to the spatial. In 
phenomenological terms, horizons are about the boundaries of our 
experience of the environment. The „edge‟, the limits and contours of 
what I see. Looking into the horizon, we only see the contours of 
objects; we can‟t fully grasp them. I think that‟s how the multicultural 
works—as something that can‟t be fully apprehended, and as 
something that is both close and distant, threatening and enriching. 
And attempts to manage it in Britain have included injunctions (such 
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as mixing and loving thy neighbour) that are cast within the 
ambivalent spatial terms of obligations to and dangers of proximity.  
Now, I‟ve been thinking about how „horizons‟ relates to „imaginaries‟. 
The documentary on Face of Britain is very much about what Sarah 
Franklin (2000) and Jackie Stacey (2010) refer to as the genetic 
imaginary. I won‟t get into that here, but the point is that „imaginary‟ as 
it is used by Stacey (who draws on psychoanalysis), is defined as 
being structured by desires and anxieties that organise a repertoire of 
fantasies that come with a set of cultural investments and 
associations. My thinking is still developing on this matter, but I am 
wondering if horizons is enough to capture those desires and 
anxieties that are constitutive of the range of fantasies that invest the 
national project: for example how migrant imaginaries and 
genealogical imaginaries meet (or not) in the naturalisation process, 
which is a new study that I am embarking on. 
Debra Ferreday: With regards to the relations between „horizons‟ and 
„imaginaries‟, it seems that the use of „horizons‟ moves away from the 
psychoanalytic focus on the subject, and is more open-ended? 
Anne-Marie Fortier: Hmm, maybe yes. In that sense, they could 
perhaps be used in combination, where horizons is more about the 
individual or national „orientation‟ towards the surrounding world and 
imagined futures (I am thinking of Sara Ahmed‟s work on orientations 
here, Ahmed 2009), and where imaginaries addresses the psychic 
structures of desires and anxieties that shape or colour those 
orientations. I‟d need to think about that.  
My thinking about imaginaries is also about trying to further theorise 
the role of affect in the prescriptions of „good‟ citizenship in 
multicultural contexts (this relates to the next question). But  it‟s more 
than that. I think that it is difficult to grasp the complexities of, say, 
citizenship without attending to the psychic processes and structures 
that shape how it is understood, policed and institutionalised. In the 
vast and extremely rich literature on citizenship, I am struck at how 
little attention is given to its psychic dimensions (pace Stevens 2010; 
Isin 2004)  
Debra Ferreday: Speaking about the role of affect… In places you 
connect haunting with affect, for example: „What does making 
composite images into a national portrait tell us about the fantasy of 
the national self? What do these figurations of a multicultural nation 
tell us about the wider anxieties, desires and imaginings that haunt 
the prospect, and project, of national introspection and self-
transformation?‟ (Fortier 2008b, n.p.). It seems like projects such as 
Face of Britain that you discuss in your book represent an attempt to 
„fix‟ a present moment and that affect is what threatens to destabilise 
this „closing down‟. Do you see affect in terms of potentiality—or as a 
„closing down‟? 
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(On a related note, I‟m interested in what seems to me to be the 
cultural pervasiveness of anxiety as a central way of thinking about 
privileged identities; the price of privilege seems to be constant 
anxiety, comparison, fearfulness—which leads me to wonder if this is 
itself a fantasy: are others imagined precisely „free from‟ the anxiety 
that is the „price‟ of privileged belonging?) 
Anne-Marie Fortier: That‟s an interesting question. And I wonder if  
you are referring to the ways in which some of the theorising of affect 
in cultural studies has conceived of affect as potential that is extra-
discursive (e.g. in the writings of Brian Massumi or Eve Sedgwick). In 
that sense, affect is disruptive because it exceeds representation—not 
in the Lacanian sense of „the real‟, but in the physical sense.2 My 
problem with this is that there is a risk of depoliticising affect, of de-
socialising and de-contextualising affect: as if feelings operate outside 
of social relations. The body, here, is very much turned onto itself.  
I don‟t conceive of affect as either potential or closing down. Yes, to 
some extent, the material I discuss in the book seeks to close down 
diasporic and multilocal attachments in favour of the unified nation/al. 
But for me, these different closing down strategies are brim full of 
affect—in that sense, affect is not an external force that would disrupt 
government strategies for managing multiculture. Rather, affect is 
integral to them and to their formation. The question that I open MH 
with (How can we conceive of „multiculture‟ in ways that address the 
complexities and intensities of feelings that it invariably ignites?) aims 
at capturing not so much the effects of affect on multiculturalist 
governing strategies, but to put affect at the centre of understandings 
of multiculturalism. Crucial here is to approach multiculturalism not so 
much as a response to the „realities‟ of cultural and ethno-racial 
pluralism, but also as an ideal aimed at the achievement of well-
managed diversity. Multiculturalism constructs visions of „the 
multicultural‟ as much as it is informed by historically specific visions 
that circulate in the wider public sphere. I consider „multiculture‟ as 
something which is put to work in ways that both result from and 
produce desires, identities, anxieties, and so on, in the reconfiguration 
of what connects inhabitants of the national space to one another, as 
well as to the nation itself. One of the upshots of this is to recognise 
how the subject is addressed as an affective subject by various 
governing strategies. Since the publication of MH I looked at 
subsequent developments in the former government‟s cohesion policy 
agenda, and it became clear to me that the subject is addressed not 
simply as the rational, autonomous, thinking subject of modernity, but 
also as a feeling subject—the affective citizen (Fortier 2010). And the 
aims of several of the policies and guidelines produced in view of 
achieving community cohesion are founded on the assumption that 
some types of activities will change people‟s feelings towards one 
another and by extension, towards their local community and that 
consequently, the nation/al will be all the better for it. Community 
cohesion is figured in localised, inter-personal relationships, and 
conceived in terms of how people have to make decisions and 
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choices about their identities/identifications. In other words, the 
version of citizenship that is privileged in the cohesion agenda is one 
where the value of personhood is based not only on individual‟s 
behaviours in their private lives, nor is it only about how they behave 
in public. It is rather how, as citizens, they direct their feelings towards 
the public. So there is a policing of the kinds of public feelings that are 
acceptable and not acceptable—protesting is bad for cohesion, talking 
about racism is bad for cohesion, meeting your neighbours in 
„meaningful exchanges‟ is good for cohesion, doing voluntary work is 
good for cohesion.  
I am not saying that the everyday relationships between neighbours 
are not to be valued, but what I am concerned about is the top-down 
managerial strategy that closes down some actions and affects as 
inherently negative, or that add a value to some actions (voluntary 
work) at the price of effectively addressing issues of inequality and 
disadvantage that are structural rather than individual. The Big 
Society is clearly a way to dispatch social responsibilities to the local, 
non-profit organisations and to individuals, and is part of the present 
government‟s strategy to whittle down the welfare state to a bare 
minimum (if that!). This process had already begun under the former 
government—so it is not simply a matter of right versus centre-left 
politics. It is characteristic of the neo-liberal governing strategies that 
numerous states have adopted since the end of the 20th century. All 
this to say that I think that there has been a kind of „affective turn‟ in 
governing strategies that can be related to the individualist politics of 
neo-liberalism. To be sure, the management of the „affective subject‟ 
is not new. Foucault has taught about how the ways in which 
individuals conduct themselves and manage their feelings in their 
private lives were subject to governance strategies in the nineteenth 
century European state. And Ann Laura Stoler (2002) has explored 
this in the context of colonising states. My point is that the cohesion 
agenda addresses individual‟s feelings and behaviour in and about 
the public, shared world they inhabit, rather than being concerned with 
individuals‟ behaviours in the private domain.   
Debra Ferreday and Adi Kuntsman: To continue with the idea of 
affective citizenship and management of national feelings… In MH, 
you talk about bodies that feel—and how boundaries of the nation are 
felt on, through and by (some) bodies. What are the bodies that feel 
the future, or through which the future is felt?  Following up from that, 
we are wondering about the relations between bodies, feeling and 
time. As you write of Face of Britain in your paper (BV),  
Decidedly located in the present, these are bodies without history: 
these are youthful faces with wrinkles, scars, and other blemishes 
ironed out, and the marks of personal lives erased, thus being 
offered up as a blank surface with no past and with only an 
imagined future rooted in a multicultural present. FoB is a „national 
fantasy from the present representing a posthistorical … future‟ 
(Berlant 1997, p. 201). (Fortier 2008b, n.p.) 
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So, for example, can you elaborate on bodies that feel (and don‟t); 
bodies with and without history, with and without future? 
Anne-Marie Fortier: It depends what feelings we are talking about. In 
the current climate of the politics of fear and securitization, who can 
be fearful and who cannot? Who can be angry and who cannot? Who 
can be hurt, and who cannot? I think that Debra‟s point about the 
cultural pervasiveness of anxiety as a central axis through which 
dominant positions are asserted is relevant to this. Looking at populist 
politics of racism and Islamophobia, for example, we can find a 
version of the anxious, hurt, fearful, angry white population who is 
injured by the perceived injustices they suffer and which is used to 
emphasise the threat posed to the future of the white nation, namely 
by Muslims. The Muslim body, here, is mobilized as one that doesn‟t 
feel, but that threatens. All bodies are de-historicised in a politics of 
resentment that displaces resentment onto „discourses of injustice 
other than class‟ as Wendy Brown put it (Brown 1995, p. 60), and 
which victimises a racialised (hence decidedly embodied) white 
working class.  
The problem is that the question of feeling is individualized, and that 
of history is collectivized, and they are separated. The issue is to think 
of them together—understanding which bodies can feel what, when 
and under what conditions invariably requires the recognition of 
history; of the contingency of feelings and of the cultural politics they 
are caught up in.   
Concluding remarks 
Following on from these thoughts about the cultural politics of bodies 
and feelings, we wanted to end this interview by thinking about the 
ways in which thinking about futurity might open up possibilities for 
radicalism, for change. We asked Anne-Marie to expand on her 
thoughts on the relations between hope and future.  
Debra Ferreday and Adi Kuntsman: Multicultural Horizons ends with 
these words:  
At least when multiculture is openly discussed, the nation/al 
confronts its own limits and there is still room for some creativity in 
thinking differently about living with difference … Therein lies my 
hope for the future: in the small lives of ordinary people who remind 
us of the productive gaps between state stipulation and normative 
discourses, and the politics of everyday social life. (Fortier 2008a, 
p. 105) 
With this in mind, we wanted to conclude our conversation by asking 
you to elaborate on this vision of hope. Where is it located? How do 
we find space for this creativity in contemporary Britain? Can hope 
survive the current political climate?  
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Anne-Marie Fortier: I am not sure that all futures are hopeful, and 
again, it depends whose future you are talking about and from whose 
perspective. In recent years, we have heard a lot about the 
disaffected youth living in areas where there are no job prospects, 
areas that are left behind as a result of the developments of global 
capitalism. In his book Race, Place and Globalization, Anoop Nayak 
(2003) writes evocatively about how young people are finding new 
ways of wrestling with questions of „race‟ and class in that context. His 
ethnography of new urban cultures caught up in the local-global nexus 
shows that futures can be hopeful but also angry, disaffected, 
resentful, melancholic... So it‟s not only that some futures may be 
more hopeful than others, but also that „hope‟ is not the only affect 
haunting our futures. 
Going back to what I said earlier and considering the national register, 
hope is invariably part of political rhetoric and governing strategies 
insofar as they are stated as solutions to specific problems or threats. 
But that hope will also bring disappointment. Think of how Obama‟s 
politics of hope is now reaping disappointment—as Judith Butler 
predicted in an article published in the days following his election 
(Butler 2008). On the one hand, his campaign did inaugurate a 
change from the Bush style of leadership and a decline in the 
paranoid and persecutory rhetorics that stressed a clash of 
civilisations, terror and a „with us or against us‟ mentality. But on the 
other hand, the characterisation of his politics as „hope‟ and „change 
we can believe in‟ suggests a shift more radical than his politics 
actually are. He is a Democrat politician, after all! That is very 
mainstream, not radical!   
Returning to the discussion of multiculturalism, the promise of 
multiculturalism was bound to bring disappointment because it was 
hailed, in its early days, as a blanket solution to misrecognition and 
discrimination. In this sense, there is a lot of investment in the fantasy 
of the omnipotent state that will and should solve social problems by 
implementing appropriate policies. Similarly, there is a lot of 
investment in the fantasy of the nation as a unifying bond that will 
result from appropriately directed feelings. Think of what I was saying 
earlier about affective citizenship, and how the management of affect 
has now become a concern for government. Think of Cameron‟s £2 
million investment in the „wellbeing‟ survey, in the midst of the most 
radical cuts in public services we have seen in decades! He is cited in 
the Guardian as saying that „It‟s time we admitted that there‟s more to 
life than money and it‟s time we focused not just on GDP but on 
GWB—general wellbeing‟ (cited in Stratton 2010). It‟s worth noting 
that this politics of wellbeing or politics of happiness is not unique to 
Britain; it is being examined by other countries such as France and 
Canada. 
My point is that there is a policing of feelings that pushes out some in 
favour of inviting, indeed prescribing others. The feeling states of the 
national fantasy are organized around an economy of feelings: the 
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production, circulation, and distribution of legitimate feelings for and 
within the nation, where the burden of the emotional labour largely 
falls upon those in minoritised positions—working-class, women, 
ethnic minorities, younger generations—who are often required to 
make the majoritised subject feel better. The currency of feelings and 
their differential value within the wider economic structure of feelings 
delineates the codes of conduct of good citizenship. And their 
exchange value is political: different feelings are attributed different 
values—or rather, they are differentially located within the „national 
values‟ against which the „value‟ of citizens is assessed. So when 
wellbeing—a hopeful state of being—is turned into a national value, it 
leaves little room for „bad feelings‟ and supports the national fantasy 
of wholeness not simply in the sense of being „one‟, but also in the 
sense of being wholesome. Not much room for those who (also) feel 
disappointed, angry, left out, or unwell. 
*** 
Anne-Marie‟s answer gives us much to consider in relation to 
questions of potential and futurity; it provides a sobering and 
thoughtful conclusion to our discussion of haunting, affect and the 
future. We end this interview by thanking Anne-Marie for discussing 
her work and sharing her thoughts with us and with the readers. And 
we leave the readers with an open question: how can haunting open 
up a possibility for a different future, a different affective mode and a 
different political orientation, without becoming naively utopian, yet 
without succumbing to national structures of feelings that leave no 
room to „bad feelings‟? 
Anne-Marie Fortier is Reader in Social and Cultural Studies at 
Lancaster University. Her most recent book is Multicultural 
Horizons: Diversity and the Limits of the Civil Nation (Routledge, 
2008). Her work draws on critical race studies, feminist theory, 
queer studies and postcolonial studies and addresses questions 
of nation formation, nationalisms, multiculturalism, citizenship 
and migrant belongings. Her current research is on the 
naturalisation process in Britain. She has also an interest in 
genetic indigenisation, about which she has recently published 
an article in Science as Culture. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
1




 In light of my previous discussion, it is worth noting that Massumi (2002) is 
not defining excess in the Lacanian sense. He is rather referring to the 
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neurological sciences that study pre-discursive physical reactions that occur 
before we are able to name the response as a particular emotion. Sedgwick, 
for her part, draws on the work of psychologist Silvan Tomkins (Sedgwick 
2004; Sedgwick & Frank (eds) 1995).  
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